Fun fact: images of Winnie the Pooh are censored in China because people makes memes comparing him to Xi Jinping.

From Venezuela, to the election of Trump, to Chinese president Xi Jinping’s recent dissolution of term limits, the rise of nationalism and authoritarianism around the world seems to have everyone on edge. The latter was the focus of panel discussion: “China’s Latest Strongman Leader: Putting Xi Jinping Into Historical and Comparative Perspective” whose title pretty much does all the heavy-lifting in describing the topic. Daily Editor and international politics enthusiast Isabel Sepúlveda attended and she’s trying not to fear for the future of The Republic as she writes this.

Running late, I slipped in at the very end of introductions but the fact that I almost couldn’t find a seat for a talk at noon on a Tuesday made it clear that the panel assembled before me was full of all-stars. Moderated by Columbia’s Carol Gluck, a Japanese expert,  it included Jeffrey Wasserstrom, a history professor at UC Irvine and Maura Elizabeth Cunningham a historian and writer, co-authors of China in the 21st Century: What Everyone Needs to Know, which recently released its third edition. CU professors Charles K. Armstrong and Lien-Hang Nguyen, experts in Korea and Vietnam respectively filled out the panel, after Nina Khrushcheva, a professor of International Affairs and Russian expert at The New School, was unable to attend due to weather conditions in Moscow.

Cunningham and Wasserstrom opened the talk providing the historical part of the “historical and comparative perspective.” They unfurled the historical story backward, starting about 10 years in the past in 2005, when China’s leader was Hu Jintao whose time in power was characterized by more collective leadership. Cunningham, who visited for the first time at the time, commented that the atmosphere felt very settled after the reigns of Mao and Deng Xiaoping, compared to the more chaotic atmosphere of the present. Wasserstrom then spoke of his first visit to the country in the 1980s during Deng’s leadership. He also outlined the most important question asked when Xi took power: would reignite the reformist agenda of the Deng era or if it would be stalled, like under Hu? They quickly flagged that this question didn’t have a good answer: Deng and Hu are more like one another than Xi is to either of them.

Now the question is whether Xi is the new Mao or the new Putin, which highlighted the unfortunate lack of the Russian perspective on the panel.  Though Xi tends to get plenty of comparisons to the former, due to the cult of personality both cultivated, Cunningham and Wasserstrom counseled against such surface historical comparisons. Today’s China is operating on a global scale with a superpower status unimaginable in the days of Mao. And despite the larger scope, he cannot command the same absolute power and the question of the internalization of his personality cult is a big one. His desire for order also speaks more toward Mao’s arch-rival, Chiang Kai-shek, a Leninist who believed in combing Confucianism and revolutionary idea, and joining the international order.  They also spoke to the importance of how history is portrayed and used as propaganda for the state, as well as by the people, a theme that popped up again and again by different panelists. All in all, their backward approach to history was incredibly helpful. As someone who is interested in the topic but only knowledgeable about recent developments, the constant root to the present contextualized everything instead of just presenting information I didn’t know what to do with.

The groundwork laid, the comparative prospective began with Armstrong, an expert on North Korea in particular, and his insights seemed particularly timely given recent reports of a summit between the US and North Korea. Generally, he said North Korea has been able to develop into a 21st century authoritarian state, by remaining connected to global trends despite heavy sanctions.  His description of this rising illiberalism, couched in ethnic nationalism, highly personalized and economically connected to corruption, rang close to home, and made it clear that China is ahead of the curve, especially in taking on aspects of capitalism while restricting democracy. North Korea’s view of China and the ties between the two countries suddenly made so much more sense to me, as well as Armstrong’s predicition that the Kim regime will continue to survive. He also spoke briefly about the changes in South Korea, which seem to be taking a slightly different tack than most of the Asian world. President Moon’s recent outreach to Vietnam and the UAE as well as the South’s role in establishing new communications with North Korea during the Olympics and with the upcoming summit show a desire to make connections outside its relationship with the US.

Next, Vietnam. Nguyen described Vietnam as a sort of mini-China with different party politics. Historically, a cult of personality like those commanded by Xi and Mao are untenable in the country, as charismatic leaders are taken down. They also have a strong focus on manipulating history, like the many wars that color its past, to their benefit. Her presentation was far shorter, eventually concluding that while Vietnam is aligned with China but attempting to contain it’s influence. Her question to Cunningham and Wasserstrom was perhaps more interesting: what could take Xi down? Unfortunately, it was not answered and I think we all were left curious as a result.

Things got a little weird here, when the moderator asked an audience member whose name I did not catch about the influence of China in South Asia, specifically India and Pakistan. He seemed like he was probably a Columbia professor she knew, though he seemed slightly shocked about his involvement in an event he came to “just to learn,” his unexpected insights were helpful. Both countries have turned more to China after their relationships with the US fractured, with India’s Modi operating more in the Chinese mold and taking steps to ensure he keeps power. In general, South Asia sees China as a new stabilizing force.

Gluck, and the Japanese perspective rounded things out, but she kept things more general than her peers. Though she spoke directly about prime minister Abe, she attributed his success far more to socio-economic conditions in Japan than the role of China, though she did say China looms large in the national psyche. Abe has thus clung to his relationship to the US instead of moving toward China like so many other countries. Otherwise, she summarized much of what the other panelists put forth: leaders must be “strong and long”(thus Xi’s abolition of term limits), the changing world order after WWII pushed us into an era of globalism has been more shocking to the system than the rise of China in the aftermath, and again, speaking to historical legacies and their power to assert national identity.

There wasn’t much time for questions after all this, though a few were asked, including one about the role of the US, in which Wasserman and Cunningham pointed out that while in the past, Chinese leaders have envied US presidents’ power, the reverse is now true (see Trump’s comment that the US should also abolish term limits). However, I think the most important question though was not one from the audience but another Gluck at the end of her summary: how do we stop the rise of this new authoritarianism but “why is this happening in different regimes at the same time?” As Armstrong put it “democratic illiberalism and illiberal democracy” seem like the only choices we have right now, especially as China continues to influence the region, and the world, with its increasingly powerful and authoritarian state.

President for Life? via Wikimedia Commons